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Abstract—One of the core properties of Software Defined
Networking (SDN) is the ability for third parties to develop
network applications. This introduces increased potential
for innovation in networking from performance-enhanced
to energy-efficient designs. In SDN, the application connects
with the network via the SDN controller. A specific concern
relating to this communication channel is whether an appli-
cation can be trusted or not. For example, what information
about the network state is gathered by the application? Is
this information necessary for the application to execute or
is it gathered for malicious intent?
In this paper we present an approach to secure the
northbound interface by introducing a permissions system
that ensures that controller operations are available to
trusted applications only. Implementation of this permis-
sions system with our OperationCheckpoint adds negligible
overhead and illustrates successful defense against unau-
thorized control function access attempts.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the main advantages of Software-Defined
Networks (SDNs) is the possibility for innovation with
new network applications. Applications can be written to
support traffic management, energy-efficiency or security
in the network. In order to support these applications,
current network state information is required. The archi-
tecture of SDN alters how this network state information
is maintained and made available to applications.
SDN splits the control plane from the forwarding
plane. A logically centralized control function maintains
the state of the network and provides instructions to the
data plane. The network devices in the data plane for-
ward data packets according to these control instructions.
There are clear security advantages to be gained
from this SDN architecture. Information generated from
traffic analysis or anomaly-detection in the network can
be regularly transferred to the controller. The logically
centralized controller can take advantage of the complete
network view supported by SDN to analyze and correlate
this feedback from the network. Based on this, new
security policies to prevent attack can be propagated
across the network. It is expected that the increased
performance and programmability of SDN along with the
network view can speed up the control and containment
of network security threats.
However, the SDN platform can bring with it a host
of additional security challenges. In [1], these chal-
lenges are identified and associated with each layer
and interface of the framework. The control-data plane
interface is sometimes referred to as the southbound
Application Programming Interface (API). The most
common southbound protocol is OpenFlow standardized
by the Open Networking Foundation (ONF) [2]. The
application-control interface is also known as the north-
bound API (we use the two terms interchangeably). A
number of protocols are implemented on this interface
e.g. RESTful, Frenetic, FML etc.
The work presented in this paper tackles the security
challenge identified in [1] regarding an unauthorized ap-
plication or controller access. The network applications
request information from the logically centralized con-
troller about the state and view of the network and subse-
quently transmit commands to the controller in the form
of data forwarding instructions. From a network security
perspective, this communication introduces potential for
malicious attack. For example, a malicious application
could use the network state information to manipulate
traffic flow for nefarious purposes. It is also possible
that unintentional security vulnerabilities be introduced
to the SDN due to poorly designed applications.
Our work is motivated by the consideration that ap-
plications should not be granted complete control and
visibility of the network. We propose that application-
control communication should be determined by a per-
missions set in a manner similar to that of the Android
permissions system. In the Android smartphone context,
a simple game would not be granted permission to read
contact information stored on the phone. Similarly, an
SDN application designed to create a bidirectional circuit
in the network should not be granted permission to
receive Packet In events, which indicate that a packet has
been received at the controller. Conclusions regarding the
network traffic could be inferred from such information,
which risks exposing the network to attack.
In this paper, we present a solution to secure the
application-control interface in a software-defined net-
work. We define a set of permissions to which the
application must subscribe on initialization with the
controller and introduce an OperationCheckpoint, which
implements a permissions check prior to authorizing
application commands. In addition, an unauthorized op-
erations log is used to audit malicious activity to build978-1-4799-6204-4/14$31.00 c©2014 IEEE
a profile for SDN application-layer attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II introduces the application-control communication se-
curity problem. Related work is discussed in Section III.
The system design is described in Section IV and results
illustrating the system operation are presented in Section
V. Discussion is provided in Section VI. Section VII
concludes this paper and outlines our future research.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
As previously noted, the interaction between network
applications and the controller takes place across the
northbound interface (NBI). This interface should allow
trusted applications to program the network and to re-
quest services/information from the network. This inter-
action can be simplified to: reading network state/writing
network policies.
Reading Network State: This involves the applica-
tion sending a HTTP GET request to the controller.
The controller interprets and converts the request to an
equivalent OpenFlow request, which it communicates to
the relevant data plane elements. The data plane elements
respond with the requested data, which the controller
interprets and provides to the application in the form of
a HTTP response.
Writing Network Policies: Similarly, to install a flow
rule on a switch, the application sends a HTTP POST
request to the controller. The controller interprets and
converts the request into an OpenFlow Flow Modifica-
tion command instructing the relevant switch to add this
flow to its flow table. The controller then sends a HTTP
response to the application confirming the success/failure
of the flow rule installation.
There are a number of weaknesses in this approach:
• No authentication of the RESTful API commands.
There is no control over the origin of HTTP requests
or confirmation of the relevance of the request for
a particular application. It is, therefore, possible for
any application to read or write network state.
• No scheme to ensure rules installed do not overlap
or interfere with one another. It is therefore pos-
sible to introduce rules that would undermine the
intended behavior of the network.
• Applications do not have to provide identity infor-
mation. As such, there is no way to regulate which
applications/policies should have a higher priority.
• No application regulation or behaviour inspection
after installation. This means that legitimately in-
stalled applications may turn malicious without
detection.
Three potential solutions arise from this assessment:
1) Rule conflict detection and correction
2) Application identification and priority enforcement
3) Malicious activity detection and mitigation
A number of solutions have been proposed for rule
conflict detection and correction and will be highlighted
in Section III. The focus of the work presented in
this paper is the application identification and priority
enforcement. An initial approach to malicious activity
detection and mitigation is also proposed in this paper
and will be progressed in future work.
III. RELATED WORK
A number of security issues have been identified with
respect to the SDN platform in [1], [3] with specific
issues relating to the security of the northbound interface.
The first of these is application policy conflict. The
problem presents itself when the controller receives
incompatible flow rules from 2 or more applications.
Several solutions have been proposed in the literature
[4]–[9]. These solutions differ in execution but all essen-
tially monitor changes in the network, construct a model
of the network behaviour and use a custom algorithm to
derive whether the network contains errors and to resolve
the policy conflict.
Frenetic [10] is a specific northbound API designed
to resolve policy conflict. It is used for programming
a collection of network switches controlled by a cen-
tralized controller. The run-time system converts flow
rules into non-overlapping policies before instructing
the controller to install the flow rules in the switches.
However, Frenetic does not authenticate the application
to the network.
Another approach to policy conflict resolution is the
use of a role-based authorization scheme such as pro-
posed in [11]. The system incorporates the FortNOX
enforcement engine, which handles possible conflicts
with rule insertion whereby rule acceptance/rejection is
dependent on the author’s security authorization. A new
flow rule that conflicts with an existing flow rule will
be detected by FortNOX. If the new (conflicting) flow
rule request was generated by a higher priority author,
then the existing flow rule will be replaced. However, if
the new flow rule is produced by a lower priority author,
then it will be ignored. A limitation of this approach is
the determination of appropriate security authorization
level. FortNOX does not resolve the issue of application
identification and priority enforcement.
The issue of exposing the full privilege of OpenFlow
to every application without protection is identified in
[12]. The authors propose PermOF with a set of permis-
sions and an isolation mechanism to enforce the permis-
sions at the API entry. The solution applies minimum
privilege to the applications protecting the network from
control-plane attacks.
The closest work related to the solution presented in
this paper is that of SE (Security Enhanced) Floodlight
[13] developed by Stanford Research Institute. It is
an extension to the Floodlight OpenFlow controller.
SE-Floodlight introduces a security enforcement kernel
(SEK), which is an improvement of FortNOX providing
detection of possible rule conflicts and mediates com-
munication between the control and data plane. The SE-
Floodlight implementation also includes a digitally au-
thenticated northbound API. An administrator is required
to pre-sign the OpenFlow application’s java class, which
may be digitally verified by the SEK at runtime. Once
signed and validated, the application has permission to
modify or query the network, or traffic on the network.
Our solution is distinguished from SE-Floodlight
by the granularity of the approach. Where SE-
Floodlight signs and validates a complete application,
our permissions-based approach enables a set of actions
to be granted to an application. This set of permis-
sions can be augmented or reduced over the life of
the application and based on monitoring application
activity. Furthermore, our solution is extensible with the
potential to apply intrusion detection approaches based
on monitoring the operations log. A further provision
of our solution is the applicability to both internal and
external applications, as described in Section IV.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN
The security requirement to regulate the information
about the network that an application can access and
the network actions that an application can execute has
been defined in Section II. In this section, we describe
the system designed to satisfy this security requirement.
The system is designed based on the Floodlight archi-
tecture (Fig. 1). Two application categories are consid-
ered; applications residing on the application plane and
communicating with the controller via the REST API
across the NBI, and module applications written as java
packages and incorporated directly into the controller.
These applications are compiled as part of the controller
and have direct access to various controller classes, their
methods and data.
A. System Attributes
The following system attributes have been identified
and are presented in the subsequent sections:
1) Define a complete set of permissions. These permis-
sions should encompass all OpenFlow-related tasks
a developer may require when developing an SDN
application. Note: The solution is also applicable to
southbound APIs other than OpenFlow.
2) Provide a secure storage structure for saving unique
application IDs mapped to the set of permissions
granted to that application.
3) Provide a means for the network administra-
tor/operator to add/remove application permissions
(by its unique ID).
Fig. 1. Floodlight Architecture and Interfaces [14]
4) Provide a REST call for applications to query the
controller and discover their assigned permissions.
5) Secure the methods, in the Floodlight controller,
that carry out the functions described by each of
the permissions in the permission set.
6) Log all unauthorized operation attempts to a log file
for auditing purposes.
B. Permissions Definition
As a first step, a set of permissions is defined. These
permissions reflect the OpenFlow related commands
used by an application to read network state or write
network policy. The permissions set is an extension of
the categorization presented in PermOF [12].
The Floodlight controller makes available a set of
REST Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs), which an
application uses to specify the resource and actions re-
quired. In order for the permissions set to encompass all
relevant actions, a permission of read controller info
is introduced. This permission encapsulates the con-
troller memory usage call. The permissions are listed
in Fig. 2.
C. Application Permissions Management
Each application is assigned a unique identifier (ID),
which is used in the application permissions manage-
ment. A LinkedHashMap structure is used to store the
application permissions. The full list of permissions is
included in this structure with the application ID used
as a key to access the permissions set. The default
Fig. 2. Categorization of Permissions with associated Screening
Method
permissions settings are false. The permissions store is
protected from unauthorized modification by encryption
and serialization.
D. Application Permissions Interrogation
A command line interface was developed to enable the
administrator to add/remove permissions for individual
applications. This PermissionsCLI provides the follow-
ing options:
1) Display a help message (with usage instructions)
2) Add/update permissions for a given application ID
3) Remove all permissions for a given application ID
E. Application Permissions Querying
In order to avoid spurious logs from unauthorized
operations, a method is provided for applications to
query the controller and discover the permissions that
they have been granted. Two querying methods are
provided; one for external applications and one for
internal java modules. Both methods are supported by
an extension of the IFloodlightService to include a Per-
missionsService interface. This interface enables retrieval
of the requested data from the permissions structure.
Internal java modules can directly access this method.
External applications can use the defined REST URI
/wm/security/id/permissions/json to request the granted
permissions information for a specific application, where
id is the application identifier.
F. OperationCheckpoint
As both internal and external applications must be
secured, it is not possible to provide the intended security
functionality by securing REST calls alone. This is
because the internal java modules have direct access
to the underlying methods that REST calls employ.
The methods themselves must therefore be secured.
This functionality is introduced in OperationCheckpoint
with a permission check method. OperationCheckpoint
is deployed in each of the methods linking to a requested
permission, as listed in Fig. 2 (screening methods).
When an operation associated with one of the permis-
sions identified in Fig. 2 is requested, OperationCheck-
point is called to determine whether the necessary per-
mission has been granted. If it has, the operation will
execute as normal. However, if the application does not
have the appropriate permission, the operation will not
complete thus protecting the network from unauthorized
access and modification.
G. Unauthorized Operations Log
A log function has been designed to log all
unauthorized attempts to modify the network
or gain information about the network. The
information logged takes the following form:
〈date〉 〈time〉 〈applicationID〉 〈deniedpermission〉.
The log function is embedded in OperationCheckpoint
and called when a requested operation is denied. The
permission breach is logged providing an unauthorized
access history. An illustration of the log file contents is
provided in Fig. 6.
In the context of network security, the log file provides
an important function. Patterns in intrusion behaviour
can be identified based on the order of attempted op-
erations recorded in the log file enabling detection and
protection against malicious application behaviour.
V. RESULTS AND EVALUATION
In this section, we illustrate the implementation of
OperationCheckpoint for the two use cases identified in
Section IV; an external application and an internal java
module.
The test environment consists of a Mininet emulated
network with a series of hosts connected to an Open-
vSwitch OpenFlow switch controlled by the modified
Floodlight Controller implementing OperationCheck-
point. The test environment runs in a VirtualBox VM
running Ubuntu 12.04 LTS.
A. OperationCheckpoint using Circuit Pusher
The first example uses the Circuit Pusher applica-
tion provided with Floodlight. This application uses
Floodlight REST APIs to create a bidirectional circuit,
which is a “permanent flow entry, on all switches in
route between two devices based on IP addresses with
specified priority” [14].
In order to create a bidirectional circuit, the Circuit
Pusher application first checks that no circuit by this
name already exists. If this is true, then the appli-
cation uses the source and destination IP addresses
to identify the source and destination switch DPIDs
and port number. Using these switch details a fur-
ther REST API call is used to discover the route
from source to destination. Both these tasks require
the read topology permission. To install the flow rules
on the identified switches between the source and
destination and complete the bidirectional circuit, the
flow mod route and set flow priority permissions
are required. In the reverse form; to delete a created
circuit, the flow mod drop permission is used to drop
the relevant flow rules from the switches on the path of
the bidirectional circuit.
The application ID is set as circuitpusher. With the
default of no permissions granted, the attempt to add
a bidirectional circuit will fail in an attempt to retrieve
switch details, as illustrated in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Illustration of failed Circuit Pusher execution due to missing
permissions
Figure 4 shows the addition of the read topology
permission. This allows the initial sections of the ap-
plication to execute successfully. However, without the
complete permission set, the flow rule insertion process
is unsuccessful. This can be verified by viewing the
switch flow table.
Fig. 4. Illustration of adding read topology permission followed by
failed Circuit Pusher execution
Following addition of the remaining required per-
missions (flow mod route and set flow priority), a
further attempt to install this circuit executes successfully
and as illustrated in Fig. 5, the flow table is now
populated with the necessary flow rules.
Fig. 5. Illustration of switch flow table contents following successful
Circuit Pusher execution
Figure 6 illustrates the log file content generated from
the unauthorized Circuit Pusher access attempts.
Fig. 6. Illustration of log file contents following unauthorized Circuit
Pusher access attempts
This test sequence of Circuit Pusher illustrates the use
of OperationCheckpoint to limit an application’s network
access based on its granted permissions.
B. OperationCheckpoint with Internal Java App
The internal java modules that act as controller-based
applications must also comply with the permissions
system. There is one clear distinction between this
operation and that of the external application. At module
initialization, a number of OpenFlow message listeners
are added. These are:
• PACKET IN: requiring ptk in event permission
• FLOW REMOVED: requiring the
flow removed event permission
• and ERROR: requiring the error event permission
In order to support internal application subscription
to these events for correct module loading, the relevant
permissions must be granted.
C. Performance
The performance penalty for introducing the permis-
sions system is evaluated by measuring the latency
introduced by the execution of the permission checks.
The permission check is consistent across all screening
methods and involves instantiating an instance of Opera-
tionCheckpoint to determine whether the requested oper-
ation is permitted. The performance penalty is therefore
evaluated by testing one of the REST calls (controller
memory usage). The execution time is recorded with and
without the permissions check. The test was repeated 8
times and the results are detailed in Table I.
The latency observed is negligible. The mean latency
introduced is 367.125µs, which imposes no noticeable
additional overhead on the Floodlight controller.
VI. DISCUSSION
In Section V, OperationCheckpoint was successfully
demonstrated. However, there are a number of observa-
tions based on the design process. The objective was to
TABLE I
LATENCY INTRODUCED BY OperationCheckpoint (µS)
Test No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Avg. Std. Dev.
Execution Time (µs) without OperationCheckpoint 3 4 4 3 10 11 4 6 5.625 2.955
Execution Time (µs) with OperationCheckpoint 512 456 417 444 227 402 211 313 372.750 103.191
Latency (µs) 509 452 413 441 217 391 207 307 367.125 104.437
secure all methods in the controller that mapped to one
of the permissions defined in the permission set. Out of
the 15 permissions listed in Fig. 2, 11 of these were
incorporated successfully and function as intended. Of
the remaining 4, two issues present themselves.
First, it is not possible to prevent access to a default
java method. The default java method accessed was
getRuntime from the read controller info operation.
It was possible to secure this operation when accessed
through a REST call but internal Java modules, due
to their internality, had access to this object that
could not be prevented. Second, extensive re-design
of the controller would have been required in order
to implement the permissions (read pkt in payload,
send pkt out, flow mod modify hdr and
modify all f lows), which was not the objective
of this work.
However, two potential solutions are identified. Public
methods could be written to support the additional per-
missions e.g. modifyFlowHeader() would be accessible
by all classes and perform only this function. These
public methods would then use the application ID for
the permissions check. Alternatively, a modular approach
could be taken to the controller, as in OSGi (Open
Service Gateway initiative) [15]. Third party developers
would create bundles to slot into the controller instead
of internal java modules. The capabilities of the bundles
would be restricted. As noted, these two solutions require
controller re-design outside the scope of this work.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The SDN architecture provides great potential for in-
novation in network applications. However, the network
map must be adequately protected to avoid malicious
or unintentional manipulation of network traffic. The
solution presented in this work proposes the allocation
of permissions to network applications, which sets limits
on application operations. The permissions check, Op-
erationCheckpoint, is demonstrated to secure the SDN
application-control interface with negligible overhead.
In our future work, we will extend this design to
map application types to permission sets to expand the
functionality of the solution. The solution may then be
used in conjunction with an Intrusion Detection System
to detect malicious activities or policy violations and
dynamically modify application permissions to suppress
malicious behaviour.
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